great white fleet definition us history

great white fleet definition us history

The Significance of the Great White Fleet in U.S. History

1. Introduction to the Great White Fleet

To accomplish this objective would require a grand and bold move. The United States had no significant interests in the Hawaiian Islands or in the Philippines at the time of the Spanish-American War. The United States wanted the territory of the Spanish Empire that was close to Japan. But, in Roosevelt’s opinion, it was necessary to have the navy stationed in the Pacific; and these newly acquired lands seemed a perfect place to have the United States’ warships. So, the admiral of the navy decided to relocate the fleet to the Pacific. The decision would serve a number of interests, and it was just what the President was searching for. He would dispatch to Asia and visit a number of friendly ports, an imposing armada.

Between 1907 and 1908, during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, United States history took an unusual and significant turn. As one who was not timid about using the U.S. Navy to protect American interests and to project American values, the 26th president suggested that the Atlantic fleet was impressive enough to deter a strike against the United States and commanded the navy to relieve it. With the United States’ increasing interest in the Caribbean as well as in the Pacific Ocean, Roosevelt decided to show and demonstrate to a number of potential adversaries the growing maritime expertise and power of the United States.

2. Political and Diplomatic Context of the Fleet’s Deployment

There was also a bit of fear factor in the legislation and sentiment. While the Hague Conventions signified a growing body of international law, and America’s international arbitration commitments were, in theory, beginning of the trend to recognition of a rules-based world order, they were also signs that all nations sense coming great power territorial crises. The Congress realized that the Navy was inadequate, and Karl H. Schuyler, reporting the bill out of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, declared, “The events of the last year show that however desirous we may be to remain at peace, we are at the mercy almost of any people who may wish to make war upon us. No sensible man could or would assert that our Navy, particularly our battleships, was in a condition in which we should wish it; certainly, its condition did not denote the prosperity of our country and gave no hint to possible enemies to leave us alone for fear of the consequences.” Yes, we use warships to gain the cooperation of others who are building a new world order, but it does help to be building. America may be serving notice on European nations that she was no longer content with being a junior partner in managing the Western Hemisphere. America pointed out her need for naval preparations, in that her battleships needed to look formidable enough to discourage raiders but at the same time be restrained enough to avoid initiating conversations that might lead to unwanted conflict with Europeans on tempting bits of her surface of influence, such as our outlying territories and prospective canal.

The navy responded to Roosevelt’s initiatives in 1902 – the Royal Navy provided the model for American naval expansion and the naval competition defense theorists would point to later. There was material reaction led by Virginia Senator Thomas Martin, the Navy Chair in the Senate, to include provisions for new battleships and a protectorate of the Panama Canal in the bill to build a canal across Central America. Secretary of State John Hay led a diplomatic initiative to convene the Second Hague Peace Conference, culminating in the Conference Consents of 1907 which made great strides in adding to the body of international law so that, when the coming territorial conflicts occurred, there would be legal precedents already established. In addition, America passed a series of international arbitration treaties, two with France and Great Britain, in 1904, and two with Italy and Spain, in 1905, establishing a growth trend in nations wanting to submit to the rule of international law under such treaties. America was eager to avoid foreign war, perhaps to keep European states from seizing more of the moribund Ottoman empire.

3. Impact and Legacy of the Great White Fleet

Not only was it the largest fleet that this country had dispatched on a foreign cruise and the longest time that a United States fleet had been away from home waters, but its friendly visits to foreign ports were so extensive that it visited more countries than any other fleet in history. Of the ten countries visited, five were members of the British Empire and at eight of the ports of call, the fleet was greeted by a member of a crowned head, a prince, or the chief authority representing the government and nobility of the country. In The Hague at the spectacular celebration of the official opening of the newest peace palace, the United States ship had a memorable part of the ceremony. The Grand Fleet had become the White Squadron and, for the first time, the American navy had served as an official representative of the country in the politics of international life.

When the Great White Fleet returned to the United States in the winter of 1909, it was lauded by the press and greeted by the large crowds as the foremost symbol of the new spirit. Speaking in Boston on the national holiday, Theodore Roosevelt hailed the successful circumnavigation as the “greatest achievement of the American people in the field of international politics of this generation, and, not after the fashion of orators, but in actual fact.” Although the president by then had turned his attention away from foreign relations to domestic issues and his official duties, the voyage of the Great White Fleet would stand as the political high-water mark of the new spirit in the long record of foreign voyages in American naval history.

4. Technological and Naval Developments of the Early 20th Century

Significant naval and technological developments, along with growing knowledge about world affairs and their organizations, had also contributed to the change in the U.S. sense of itself and its international role. As a result of the Spanish-American War, the United States found itself in possession of colonies and lacking adequate naval armaments to control them. Such “open door” trading concerns as John Hancock quickly realized that the survival of the craft depended upon the safe and free passage of their goods across the Pacific to China and Japan. These business concerns therefore emphasized and ultimately created a large part of the demand for a new postwar naval policy. Small Postal Commandants and the cruiser New York soon embarked upon several demonstration and goodwill cruises to the entwined foreign and American future markets of Asia, Australia, and Latin America. Such missions seemed to indicate that an informal fleet of cruisers would be the best guarantor of future open lines of communication and trade routes.

The early 20th century was a period of significant change in both American society and U.S. foreign relations. Economic growth, industrialization, wealth accumulation, and technological change transformed the nation and played an important role in the beginnings of changes in the national culture. In the field of international relations, economic growth and changes in the world balance of power were accompanied by growth in the U.S. merchant fleet, U.S. investment abroad, in the U.S. Army, and in the European presence in the Far East. The United States, primarily concerned with economic development and continental expansion during the 19th century, was now outgrowing its borders and beginning to act as a major world power. Changes were thus apparent in economic, military, and political affairs, and several decisions taken by the Taft Administration in 1909-1910 reflected this international transformation. These events should be viewed in the context of Progressive Era decision making, of special and long-range U.S. Pacific policies, as well as of international relations in general.

5. Conclusion: The Great White Fleet’s Lasting Influence on U.S. Naval Strategy

The last cruiser was laid down less than two years after the fleet steamed home. Overweight in staffing, branch trained but from manpower that had yet to apprenticeship and permissions were allowed to some ambitious individuals an early crossing to action via the portals if not Section leader and cadet became better-defined jobs and more important to the hosts by 1911. Certainly the damage-control sessions by the Great White Fleet Alumni associated with the annual naval reviews sent out a message that was even more specific than the parades: the U.S. Navy was now a principal force in the U.S. national strategy – the use of seagoing forces to escort or intercept potential or actual commerce-raiding forces as well as in the traditional U.S. Navy logistic roles in transoceanic amphibious warfare. As future wars were fought, important historians would remember that the U.S. Fleet had indeed sent messages: all the way to 1919.

In its spectacular way, the Great White Fleet demonstrated that the United States had achieved the two major naval goals of its expanded role. Members of Congress, taken to Manila to watch annular target practice by the battleships in June 1928, basked “in the reflected glory of a navy that had returned to the areas and tasks by whom it was to be used.” The American naval renaissance seemed complete. Whether the achievement measured up to Peabody’s completion of the commission’s plans was a far more weighty matter. Theodore’s fleet spawned an admiration for naval parades on the part of the American people, a bicameral commission to investigate the results, and considerable testimony to prove that the armored cruiser was a worthwhile vessel indeed. The U.S. Navy had made a tremendous stride from isolated colonial navy to world-power forces and the escorted commerce-raiding forces that would have to cross oceans in time of war.