cognitive science religion and theology summary

cognitive science religion and theology summary

The Relationship Between Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology

1. Introduction

Sometimes certain things can only be explained or properly understood with the help of metaphor. In this essay, the main metaphor for the study of cognition is that of a machine. However, Shell is also interested in the actual limits of the metaphor. In what ways can human cognition be accurately compared to a machine, and in what ways can it not? Simulation theory, a topic he revisits later in its own chapter, is one way in which cognitive activity is compared to an actual procedure of computation. There is an implicit assumption with all these theories in cognitive science that the human mind can, in fact, understand itself. This is not a question that can be taken for granted, and it is one that has considerable implications for the study of humanity as well as the study of cognition. Also, if we can understand and recreate the cognitive processes that give rise to certain types of thought and behavior, what does that tell us about the nature of human thought? Does it suggest that all thought and behavior can be reduced to these processes, or that these processes can only give rise to certain manifestations of thought and behavior? This line of questioning has often been considered by cognitive scientists in passing, but there are few who have focused exclusively on it. The answers to these questions have significant implications for a variety of other fields, including the other topic of this essay, religion. This essay is not exclusively about the relationship between cognitive science, religion, and theology. It is about the questions mentioned above, and it uses the topic of religion as an illustrative tool in answering these questions. However, by his own admission, Shell chose religion as a topic for its “intrinsic interest”. In other words, he has an interest in the topic for its own sake, which differs from the instrumental interest in using it to answer more general questions about the nature of humanity. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the essay will still serve those with no particular interest in religion or theology, as the questions it addresses are far from peripheral to the rest of cognitive science.

2. Understanding Cognitive Science

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field of study. It is an amalgam of many subjects. Because of this, it is difficult to define directly, rather it is, as Thagard describes, “the coordination of multiple approaches and methods to study the mind”. It is an attempt to create a scientific and comprehensive understanding of the process and structures of the mind. The reason that cognitive science may be of interest to theologians can be the insight provided by scientific study into human mental functioning, as well as the implications of a scientific understanding of humans on humanities understanding of humans. This could potentially provide a challenge to theology in terms of its implications on religious belief. This section will begin with a description of a cognitive theory of concept. It will then guide the reader through the basic premise of a computational theory of mind, before introducing connectionist theories. This will provide a framework within which the essay shall address the implications of cognitive science for religious and theological thought.

3. Exploring the Role of Religion in the Human Mind

For example, in a recent study in Mauritius, participants were tasked with reading and explaining a taboo-violation story which they had previously recounted to have been more or less morally condemning. In the same conversation, participants were instructed to point out infractions to a taboo found in Mauritian Hinduism. It was found that the more the story had violated moral laws (or harmless taboo), the more likely they were to attribute the events of the story to supernatural forces. Religion as a system for understanding negative (and positive) life events thus spans across the cognitive mechanisms underlying inferences on real events and those underlying moralistic input.

The idea that religion is a by-product of other cognitive processes has been championed by HADD (Hyperactive Agency Detection Device), which argues that an over-attribution of effects in the environment to human-like agents was adaptive in the evolution of Theory of Mind. Such ideas come close to offering an overarching theory of religion. However, while HADD is certainly an important element of religion, and DYSR (a by-product of the evolution of the brain’s social cognitive mechanisms in an environment of minimal counterintuitiveness) has potential as a theory, there is as yet little evidence to suggest that religious cognition is anything but a series of interacting cognitive systems and religion as a set of behaviors and institutions.

The cognitive science of religion has tended to define religion rigidly as a series of beliefs about supernatural agents, with theories explaining the functions of such beliefs on the assumption that they are the central core of religion. A more interdisciplinary approach would look at the cognitive, emotional, and motivational systems underlying religious thoughts and behaviors and attempt to explain religion as a pattern of interacting subsystems rather than a single mental faculty.

4. Examining the Intersection of Cognitive Science and Theology

The focus of the cognitive science of religion thus far has been diverse and has addressed topics ranging from the acquisition and transmission of specific religious ideas to the comparison of secular and religious cognitive processes. However, cognitive scientists have increasingly been drawn to collaborative work with academics and religious professionals from fields such as theology in an effort to understand the possible implications of their research for religious communities and to gain a broader understanding of religious phenomena in order to inform their own research. An example of this would be research attempting to compare cognitive theories of pan-religion across cultures, with attempts to define and understand such theories by theologians and religious studies scholars.

Historically, since the emergence of cognitive science within academia, cognitive-based approaches to the study of religious belief have played a seminal role in shaping the field. This is evident in the widespread use of terms such as “good” and “bad” folk theories of religion within the cognitive science of religion and in reference to cognitive psychology. Both have served as spearheads for the cognitive approach. While early work was more prescriptive than descriptive in nature, basic and applied research in the cognitive sciences has the potential to contribute to understanding religion across cultures and addressing social issues that involve religious beliefs and practices.

5. Conclusion

With respect to Wayne Auyang’s method of defining the relationship of two fields to be one of constraint, saturation, interaction, or emergence, a definitive answer may be far off. The exceptions religion may produce in any particular cognitive process may refute any global conclusions about a relationship. At the most general level, it may be safe to assume that religious cognition is just a minor variation of normal human cognition. Going on the research covered of mental disorders, MMR, and by-product theory, it appears religion may just be explained as a by-product of mental apparatus not functioning properly. Boyer’s and Barrett’s theory posed more complexity, but ultimately their universalist theory about religious cognition appears to be too ambitious an attempt at a grand unified theory of religious cognition and may simply reduce religion to a normal part of human cognition.

There is much to be said about the debate centering on the relationship between cognitive science and religion, about the Cognitive Science of Religion. There have been countless debates and attempts to define both the term “religion” and attempt to define the relationship of the two. There has been an attempt to understand under what, if any circumstances, religion can be explained away by cognitive functions; as Pascal Boyer says religion can be a “pathological” offshoot of normal cognitive functions. There has also been debate as to what religion can tell us about the cognitive functions of humans and under what circumstances religious belief affects typical cognitive processes (e.g. de Sousa). With such a wide breadth of research, the topic may still be in its adolescence and still developing; however, some generalizations and conclusions can be drawn.