bonus army definition us history

bonus army definition us history

The Bonus Army: A Defining Moment in U.S. History

1. Introduction to the Bonus Army

The bonus issue had remained somewhat dormant during the early years of the New Deal because President Roosevelt enjoyed strong political support from Congress and could offer veterans a version of their “bonus”: precedence in hiring and relief work. A new, non-ideological veterans’ organization known as the Bonus Expeditionary Force, or Bonus Army, was planned for 1936. However, existing veterans’ organizations refused to support another direct action march, and the BEF march did not materialize. In 1936, Congress, responding to the deepening Depression, passed legislation to make the original bonus payable in 1945, but Congress did agree to liberalize the terms of the veterans’ insurance. The BEF eventually became the Veterans of Future Wars of Foreign Wars. The B.E.F. episode, a source of bitter controversy and disillusionment, profoundly shocked the nation. Religious editor William Tweed dramatized it in his column with these words: “MacArthur, with the backing of the President, turned a regiment of American veterans into a regiment of Bolshevik soldiers. The spirit and action are Bolshevism at its worst… Do not believe that this is the end. Remember the Bonus Marchers of 1932, and the great unrest following that blightering fiasco. We are rapidly approaching the condition where a Bonus Army, swollen many times, will take what is wanted, and no government of thumbscrew and machine-guns will be able to stop them.”

The so-called Bonus Army was the popular name for an assemblage of some 43,000 marchers—17,000 World War I veterans, their families, and affiliated groups—who gathered in Washington, D.C., in the spring and summer of 1932 to demand cash-payment redemption of their service certificates. Organized by a group of communist agitators, the march was widely supported by the American public as well as the government. President Hoover approved Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur’s controversial dispersion of the protesters as a means of reducing danger to Washington. Afterward, General MacArthur, with the support of Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, was sharply criticized for excessive use of force.

2. Origins and Background of the Bonus Army

The United States Army of the twentieth century was largely a conscript force. The draftees of the First World War were, by and large, willing to serve, and as a result, more than four million of them were inducted into the armed forces. When, after the war, Congress authorized certain compensation payments to the soldiers, including what was called a “bonus,” the veterans association had little to say about it. Passage of the law was encouraged by the financing plans, which deferred part of the payment until 1945, a date far enough into the future to make the immediate levy less burdensome. When the dread depression arrived, the veterans began to cast longing eyes upon that potential pot of gold at the end of the bonus rainbow. Many of them had been hardened by war, many more embittered by postwar events. They felt that the United States was washing its hands of them and of the sacrifices that they had made in its behalf and in the behalf of others. Now was the time to cash in the bonus.

3. The March on Washington, D.C.

The funds needed to pay for the bonuses were to come from veteran “bonus bonds” that had been paid from the proceeds of the 1924 “World War Adjusted Compensation Act.” It is important to note that the U.S. Congress had earmarked money for veterans’ benefits in 1924 and that by 1932, the bonuses that the veterans were seeking had already been spent on economic development and veterans’ benefits. However, with unemployment rates running at about 25 percent in 1932, the bonus certificate had become much more valuable as “economic security” or as “a support,” Waters said. Waters drafted the bonus bill and persuaded Congressmen to support its passage. The march was a peaceful display of military might until Congress killed the bill on June 17 and ordered the “Bonus Army” to leave the city. Waters did not request an extension of the gathering, but one self-appointed Bonus Army leader did; and the movement was ordered removed. Afterward came a long and bloody night of destruction as Washington police, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, brutally broke up the “Bonus Army.”

On May 23, 1932, World War I veterans began populating the roads and parks of the capital city before staging a full-scale occupation of governmental land set aside for their use. The “forgotten men,” the “doughboys,” were soon labeled as the “Bonus Army” or the “Bonus Expeditionary Force.” The “Bonus Army” was demanding the immediate cash payout of the “adjusted service certificate,” a component of the 1924 World War Adjusted Compensation Act that had the architect of the march, Walter W. Waters, as a hero of the group. The bonus certificates could not be redeemed until 1945, but many marchers were out of work in 1932 and needed the money to recoup at least part of their future lost wages.

4. The Aftermath and Legacy of the Bonus Army

Representative Wright Patman, a tenacious champion of the Bonus Army in Congress, took over sponsorship of a bill proposing the early cash payment of the Bonus. Several weeks after the army’s eviction from the Capitol, the House of Representatives passed the so-called Patman Bonus Bill, or World War Adjusted Compensation Act, which proposed the immediate payment of the bonus in a vote of 304-59. Although the Senate had previously voted against the Bill by a two-to-one margin, the Senate passed it in the early summer by a narrow vote of 43-38, despite President Hoover’s resolute opposition. The President had managed to hold off his opponents until June 15th, when the House of Representatives voted to override his veto by an overwhelming margin of 316-97. The Senate followed suit by agreeing to the override in the Senate, with a vote of 62-18. President Hoover stated, “It is inconceivable that this country feels confident that it can maintain its credit and business if there is not moral integrity in fulfilling its obligations.”

President Herbert Hoover’s decision to forcibly evict the Bonus Army from the shadow of the Capitol did little to enhance his reputation or to bolster his prospects for a second term in office. The American public’s negative reaction to the President’s actions served to increase its growing disenchantment with the Hoover administration. Little did President Hoover or anyone else realize that the economy was actually in the process of hitting bottom that summer. For years, Americans viewed President Hoover as insensitive and oblivious to their mounting suffering. Ironically, President Hoover had initially approved limited funding to extend benefits for a few more years, but when the issue was later debated in 1931, he stated that a country in as tough shape as America could not afford to pay a bonus that would threaten the integrity of the government.

5. Conclusion: Impact and Significance of the Bonus Army Movement

The episode focused attention on other, more immediate, issues. What were the immediate needs of the bonus marchers? How could these needs be satisfied? Should the Veterans’ Bureau be charged with the task of taking care of their health problems, their job requirements, and their difficulty in adjusting to peacetime thinking? If not the Veterans’ Bureau, then who? The Administration believed that in ordinary times the state should not be required to concern itself with such matters or to find answers to such questions. The Attorney General ruled that it was perfectly proper for the army to pass the buck onto the Veterans’ Bureau, or the Red Cross, or any other established agency willing to provide limited services. The Veterans’ Bureau and the other agencies, already overburdened with regular problems, passed the buck back to the army. While the buck-passing flourished, frustrations mounted. As they did in other fields—propelling Americans toward numerous individual, sectional, and racial and political attitudes—which tested the effectiveness of various solutions which the political system had adopted during the preceding years.

The Bonus Army and the government’s response to it graphically underlined the complexities of problems arising out of World War I. These men had been led to believe that because they had embraced the duty of service in their country’s hour of need, they had a right to obtain tangible evidence of their services’ worth. The Administration took a different view. In its collective judgment, society owed no greater debt to these men than to the war’s hundred million other participants. This attitude was consistent, as boundaries go, with a position which Congress had taken and modified several times during the decade.