dutch government collapses

dutch government collapses

The Collapse of the Dutch Government: Causes, Implications, and Future Prospects

1. Introduction to the Dutch Political System

The book addresses important aspects before and after the government has been formed, such as the main constitutional principles, electoral thresholds and party system, electoral integrity, government formation, coalitions, roles and offices, investitures, allocation of portfolios, and processes and procedures in office. The 2017 act to remedy the current problems with the current formation procedure, scheduled to apply for the 2021 formation, constitutes a first step in this direction. There are various approaches to reach an understanding of government formation, including coalitions led by the leaders of the largest party.

The Dutch government recently resigned after the findings of a report on the benefits scandal which took place over the past decade. The Minister of Finance, Wopke Hoekstra, recently announced he would stand for election as the Prime Minister in 2021. The caretaker government would be led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte in order to handle the crisis over the COVID-19 without causing uncertainty in the Netherlands. In the case he wins the election, it is expected that he will be able to manage the economic aftermath caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Dutch political system falls under the category of important electoral systems in Europe, being based on coalitions, political fragmentation, and case-by-case alliances.

2. Factors Leading to the Collapse of the Dutch Government

Large scale events involve a multiplicity of causes, and the collapse of the Dutch government is no exception to this rule. Nevertheless, a relatively small set of factors carries enormous weight in explaining the turn of events that are detailed in the previous section and their timing. Our discussion of these then sets the stage for a more detailed analysis of other specific measurables, and identification of broader strategic issues that may yet lie hidden. These factors are not only of immediate significance in accounting for why the events of 1977-78 took place. Since they revolve around the inherent “tightness” of the Dutch political and economic systems and the set of established legal norms to which politicians and public officials are subject, they shed light as well on why these deeper features of Dutch society are today coming in increasing tension with the bulk of public expectations and the reality of what are rapidly turning into the economic, and perhaps also political, exigencies of the Dutch voters being reproduced within.

3. Implications of the Government Collapse for the Netherlands and the EU

Rather, the consequences of a new election, if it serves for any useful purpose (that is a big if), might be to demonstrate at last that leaving the old “Christian,” liberal, and socialist bloc structures in Parliament, both Netherlands and the European Union have entered a post-parliamentary phase where the unilateral decisions of governments around the European Council tables mean that governments, not parliamentary coalitions, make the big decisions for the reasons they see fit. They all agree on Europe. They know what they are doing. They listen, if they choose to listen, not to hostile noises from their domestic oppositions but to the voices of one another and of themselves, as in all good European democracies which practice their own EU version of the Elizabethan settlement.

Given the superficial nature of the opposition’s objections and the overwhelming cost of new elections and theoretical frivolity of a wholesale change of government, there is no reason to expect any change of government as a result of the elections. Rather, if the CDA wins, it would be likely to continue as an essentially Kohl-Mitterrand loyalist government which would make a distinct priority of European monetary union, while if the main winner is the PVDA, it would join the present government coalition in key European policy outlines. Of course, if there is an upset and the coalition does join the opposition, it would be even more pro-European than it is now. There is no set of circumstances under which either the CDA or PVDA would, as a factor of a new European policy, take a more skeptical line in the present framework of intergovernmental decision making.

4. Challenges and Opportunities for Forming a New Government

We need political stability at the national level to prove to our partners that we are capable of tackling the huge problems. The resignation of the Dutch government over the issue of NATO nuclear missiles has created a major crisis in the Netherlands, and raised serious questions and doubts in the capitals of Western Europe and North America concerning future Dutch policy and indeed future Dutch credibility, dependability, and viability. Premier Van Agt and major members of his cabinet were unable to convince their Labour Party partners of the necessity of going along with the NATO dual-track decision finalized in Brussels. The Labour ministers resigned, and the entire cabinet followed. As serious as the present Dutch crisis may be, it pales in comparison with the challenges that lie ahead for the formation of a new Dutch government and more importantly the prospects for Dutch politics over the next decade. For one, the present crisis could not have surfaced at a more inopportune time, as The Netherlands is facing a serious economic recession, social unrest, and rising defense costs. For another, Dutch politics are increasingly characterized by inefficiency and stagnation in the process of decision-making, as well as short-term self-interest at the expense of the overall eco-political interest. It is at the threshold of a new era, including a long future of centrist-reformed coalition-government politics or a faltering detour toward extreme left- or right-wing policies, that this chapter addresses the diplomatic, political, and defense-policy issues surrounding the continuation of Dutch as a reliable member within and alongside the larger Western Community.

5. Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Future Scenarios

A minority government has both advantages and disadvantages. In the light of the overrepresentation of opposition parties in both chambers and the resultant offers of major cooperation in resolving enormous problems stemming from decisions of the European Commission and the Council, where the three former coalition partners will no longer form part of the Benelux phalanx, the present minority government has already given much political pleasure and brought home naught but much political grief. Moreover, the other coalition partners are so imbued with an ever clearer task of government that a peaceful transition and election of a new government could perhaps create the first Dutch majority government in 28 years to complete the process of modernization of government. It is something to think of.

The mechanisms for the fall of the Dutch Cabinet are a pure matter of the Netherlands’ completely non-presidential party government. It is obviously the incomplete process of modernization of government that is at stake, a consequence of the lack of congruence with the mass of conservative voters of the policies proclaimed on account of the inevitable and intensifying integration with Europe. The question is what conclusions the protagonists will draw. The leading politicians of the two coalition partners seem too liberal to become pallbearers of the non-presidential party democracy that they tried so hard to resuscitate in the Office of the States General during the government interregnum.