appeasement us history definition

appeasement us history definition

The Practice of Appeasement in U.S. History: A Comprehensive Analysis

1. Introduction to Appeasement in U.S. History

The British and French policy of “appeasing” the German dictator by allowing him to diplomatically, illegally and stealthily expand his territorial will, was intended to prevent Germany from starting a widespread war in Europe. Chamberlain, seeking to avoid a Third World War, which would be more deadly and destructive than the first and second of global proportions, was unyielding in his belief that Germany could be reasoned with, and lacked the moral and psychological will to act with force at any acceptable level of risk. His willful blindness and obduracy to the consequences of his policy shaped and delayed the attitudes of the British and French until the German’s Foreign Policy, ambiguously stated goals, and sporadic actions materialized into full out war when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939.

This paper focuses on the practice of appeasement in American history. The concept of appeasement evokes the historical era when British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, agreed to allowing Germany to expand its territorial conquests in exchange for German assurances to restrict further expansion. The events of the RAF Tonypandy bombing on Chamberlain’s home and the waste of Allied Air force-strike capability, which could have brought the war to an end as it began, benumbed the British. These costly events convinced the British public that Chamberlain’s appeasement policy was aimed at avoiding a European war with Germany and acquiescently accepting German territorial ambitions in the interest of peace.

2. Key Events and Examples of Appeasement Policies

Between 1919 and 1981, over 407,000 square miles, 65 million people, $200 billion in industrial output, and $123 billion worth of agricultural output were lost by the victims of the treaty signed in France. Britain and the U.S.A., but supposedly only the U.S.A., followed the recommendation to promote “home rule.” The results were predictably disastrous. The beneficiaries of Woodrow’s missionary operation to make the world safe for democracy were the U.S.A. with its $4 billion canceled by the colonially-impoverished nations who were the victims of Woodrow’s sanctimonious hypocrisy. His fourteen points had obviously included a heavy dose of U.S. misguidance of other nations.

Possibly the most glaring example of U.S. appeasement, both illustratively and in reality, is the Anglo-French-American exercise in trying to keep the peace through placating belligerents by making territorial concessions of other countries without consulting the country involved. The context of Munich in 1938 and the three “weakness of the democracies” incidents of not fulfilling the treaty conditions of the peace settlement at the end of the Great War. Without consultation, Czechoslovakia’s major natural defenses, the Bohemia mountains, were divested from Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty. The Czechs could hardly survive without the benefits derived from these borders with Germany, Hungary, and Poland. It was an open invitation for everything Czech to be turned over to Germany, sponsored Slovak nationalism, and secured the subsequent violation of the remainder of the Czechoslovakian border.

3. Critiques and Consequences of Appeasement Strategies

Critiques and Consequences of Appeasement Strategies. Part II, excerpted from his book Options of Last Resort: Serious Dispute Settlement in War-Torn Societies (University Press of America, 2008), examines the dilemmas in some detail and suggests that public endorsements of “durable” resolutions of serious social conflicts by avoiding the use of force are often times little more than vacuous bravado. Set off a whirl of conciliatory domestic and foreign policies prior to World War II, when he attempted to appease Hitler at the Munich Conference of 1938. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939 started the war, Chamberlain was excoriated by intellectuals, politicians, and the public. Europe lay waste, and Communists seized half the continent. The lesson presumably was that appeasement was wrong. Some saw it as a criminal blunder, and none but superannuated historians could excuse it.

Appeasing our foes: Lessons supposedly learned from critical with President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain set off a whirl of conciliatory domestic and foreign policies prior to World War II, when he attempted to appease Hitler at the Munich Conference of 1938. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939 started the war, Chamberlain was excoriated by intellectuals, politicians, and the public. Europe lay waste, and Communists seized half the continent. The lesson presumably was that appeasement was wrong. Some saw it as a criminal blunder, and none but superannuated historians could excuse it.

4. The Legacy of Appeasement in U.S. Foreign Policy

Throughout the period from 1936 to 1939, American objective support for the European crisis was negligible. Indeed, at the climax of the period, in the vital months leading to Munich, isolationist forces in American life threatened to sabotage the stabilization of the global economic framework. Once again, the policy of isolation and appeasement discovered a permissive and insufficient Roosevelt administration and a fragmented and chaotic polity. Absolutists of peace, spitters of war, those who followed appeasement in Hitler’s time were abstractly – more loyal Americans than we whose policy was peace.

The economic sanctions of free-enterprisers were the American response to Nazi penetration of Latin America, as they consistently appeased American trade with Europe. The insistent demand in the House of Lords speech for the improvement of British armaments “to any level,” combined with the announcement of US Financial Policy, in the same year, to stimulate quite considerable investment and trade with South American gainer groups at a time when the American economy was collapsing. Based on any reasonable assessment of the material possibilities, of what Britons and Americans could and might have done, both programs were futile.

The appeasement launched by Lord Halifax and Lord Lothian in 1936 urged on behalf of “decent, ordinary German people” fifteen “lost” years of Hitler. The effective political, military, and strategic allegations of the Independent “guarantees” of the Munich Pact were the instruments of appeasement, suggested by Baron and Countess von Ribbentrop and jotted down by certain American senators for Ariene Dart, the American Ambassador at Bucharest.

So, has appeasement persisted in American foreign policy, leaving a record of bitter choices and bitter consequences? I believe that a strong case can be made for its presence. I believe, also, that American history would offer objective support for the traditional statement that appeasement is a policy of democracies. For however remote and shadowy the roots of the United States and her foreign policy may appear in the setting of Munich or the Spanish Civil War, the strategic aim of each of these episodes is the defense of a democracy. And in the history of American policy with Europe from 1936 to 1941, there are threads of recent diplomatic experience.

5. Conclusion and Reflections on the Practice of Appeasement

Another set of characteristics of appeasement pertains to the general factors and developments which facilitate or impede its practice. The nature of the appeasing state and its interests in the world community is one criterion. The stability of the internal political system in the appeasing state and the intensity of the perceived threat from the challenging state makes the practice of appeasement more likely. Foreign policy momentum and credibility have characteristics which may facilitate the practice of appeasement. Several situational developments can contribute either to a temporary or to a more prolonged group appeasement orientation. Over a generation for American history isolated, instrumental instances of group appeasement appear to form and dissolve without advancing to a consistent orientation to offer large-scale assistance with marking time or even annihilating the provider. Group dynamics associated with the specific situation and the U.S. ascult leader effects are major variables in group offers of appeasement. An increasingly favorable strategic position and an exaggerated perception of the opponent’s internal and external power are also contributing dynamics.

One set of characteristics of appeasement are its imperfections. Offers to go to substantial lengths to appease do not necessarily cause divisive antisystem domestic opposition. While not all attempts to appease are fit primarily to establish and reassure image, under certain conditions of challenge it appears to generate few costs and encourage the recipient of the offer to question the acuity of the actor. Success with practicing appeasement induces not only an improved sense of worth and an increased self-confidence on the part of the beneficiaries of appeasement, but tends to make them more aggressive.

The practice of appeasement is an as yet imperfectly understood characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. It is neither rigid nor static. Its minimal components are a strong desire for peace and low sensitivity to dangers and costs relevant to achieving this objective. An administration attempting to pursue appeasement has several alternative policies and many approaches. Most instances of appeasement fail to achieve the intended objective and invite rather than block the aggression they hope to alleviate. Finally, failure to block aggression or prevent the emergence of significant security threats to the U.S., despite both a professed desire to do so and resulting costs, leads to significant modifications in U.S. foreign policy. Five cases and two generations of U.S. diplomatic history are selected for analysis because they illustrate various aspects of practice and its consequences.