warsaw pact us history definition

warsaw pact us history definition

The Warsaw Pact: A Comprehensive Analysis in US History

1. Introduction to the Warsaw Pact

The mutual assistance treaty signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, came to be known as the Warsaw Pact. It united ten European countries in a military alliance. The ten signatories—Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia—agreed to mutual assistance in case someone suffered an armed attack by an outside party. According to the text of the treaty, “on no account shall the forces or the territory of any of the Pact’s powers be used to the detriment of the security of any of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty.” In October 1954, the Soviet Union recognized the rapidly-growing national movement in Austria. Soviet authorities were informed that the United States would take measures if the Austrian government had sought British and French military support to retain power. Eleven countries signed the Austrian treaty prohibiting military supplies, fortifications, and establishment of military bases. France and the Soviet Union did not sign this treaty. However, it was agreed not to use nuclear weapons against Austria, while the Soviet foreign minister, V. M. Molotov, would be on Overall Allied Control Council during a 2-month transitional period. The removal of occupying troops from Austria was settled, and the Austrian government had announced their independence. The signed treaty requirements would take effect on the notification date.

The conclusion of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 ensured that the newly formed Eastern bloc was not just some temporary alliance among Communist nations against capitalism, but something larger. This fact makes the Warsaw Pact far more significant to the overall Cold War narrative than it might otherwise be. This module will discuss the formation of the pact and its mechanisms, why it was created, and what it sought to achieve. In addition, this module will deal with its status as a military alliance pitted against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

2. Origins and Purpose of the Warsaw Pact

During an alliance, a clear distinction between internal defense and external defense will be established. The former is the key mission of the local defense forces and consists of defense against limited aggression by regional powers. If a limited local aggression escalates into a more serious military threat involving the major powers, the defense of the theater will become a secondary mission. The forces that would be able to establish a proper defense against limited aggression will be deeply surprised by the transition to its secondary mission. First, such forces will not exist any longer in the way they did before the beginning of the alliance; second, transformation takes time and the strategic guidelines are important. Regardless of any good intentions in the alliance, the first strategic line in the containment of threats by external powers will stretch along the territories of the most exposed allies. Therefore, a clear change in force concentration may be visible in the initial reaction of the response.

One of the main topics in studies of international alliances is their formation and purpose. Why do states ally? When do they form blocs? What are the specific threats they are trying to protect themselves from? Some well-known grand theories of alliance formation propose that when states are confronted with a common opponent, who is either militarily powerful or territorially expanding, they find safety in numbers and establish one or more ties in order to contain or deter that common enemy. One of the forces that enhance the credibility of the alliance commitment is a concrete military feature – that others see the alliance members as an amalgamated alliance. This argument, which has been elaborated upon by a couple of historians, is highly important in understanding the evolution of the Warsaw Pact. The best example of an amalgamated alliance can be found in the construction of the Atlantic Alliance after World War II.

3. The Warsaw Pact in the Context of the Cold War

In order to avoid the mutual destruction that could come about from a direct confrontation that was both military and massive, during the second half of the 20th century, the superpowers were able to directly confront each other in situations that were economically and politically dependent on the interventions they made through agents, partners, and allies. These agents were trained for warfare and the harsh life of the soldiers. They utilized the technology and resources that the superpowers provided, risking war themselves as they fought wars in other countries or as they defended, both directly and indirectly, given that threats were made against them for their political choices.

In the territorial respect, the Cold War and therefore the Warsaw Pact took place mainly, but not exclusively, on territory outside of the metropolitan frameworks of Europe and North America. This made Europe the ideal place for US-Soviet conflicts and competition to come to fruition and manifest. The influence of the Great Powers was projected in military, economic, and technological terms. It was superimposed upon predominantly European conflicts, perpetuating a series of political situations of relative imbalance, both in Europe and also to a certain extent in the areas peripheral to the old continent.

The Cold War, and therefore the Warsaw Pact, existed within a context that was deeply affected by the era. This context is not exclusively related to the temporal aspect of the time. The most important aspects of the concept of context relate more to territorial, political, economic, and social aspects.

4. Dissolution and Legacy of the Warsaw Pact

The fact that the various allies felt that they were not the masters of their fate became evident concomitantly with the increasing military dimension that the alliance acquired from 1948 to 1955. The Treaty itself – viewed as a purely Eastern European defense alliance – was not detested per se. It was no secret that the FRG wanted to make use of it to achieve recognition and security from its erstwhile enemies. It is interesting to note that, in their efforts to divide the USSR and the GDR, the majority of the westerners made use of the spirit of the Warsaw Pact as their own basis of their policy. Since the Soviet Union could not disown its defense obligations towards its Eastern European allies, then the military part of the Treaty would have to remain. It was no mere coincidence that, without, of course, being completely realistic about it, the Western powers – use of the spirit of the foundation of the MWP – tried to turn the Tauber Athena of the 20-21 July ECSC discussions into a major weapon against Moscow. For, in 1955, Molotov was faced with a terrible choice; either talk or risk seeing Cardonne’s proposals succeed (i.e., see the FRG join NATO under sufficiently favorable conditions.) This would, in effect, have slightly weakened the link between Paris and the increasingly pro-Soviet – and unstable – GDR. Molotov chose to talk. After all, it was not the first time that the matter came to a head.

In this chapter, the assertion will be made that while the instruments of the alliance – including the dissolution of the Pact itself – were of immediate importance, it was, in reality, the nature of the verbal commitment that the Pact signatories perceived in 1955 that dissolved in 1989, and that those who witnessed the events showed considerable distaste for participating in this alliance. They obviously considered the organization as doomed ab initio – even if they had not been able to convince Moscow at the time. The focus will be on Gorbachev’s search for a change of world image for the USSR, as well as on the role of the FRG in this respect. In conclusion, some comments about the legacy of the alliance and about the future role of the Soviet Union in Europe will be made. What is to be said about the European allies? It would be worth wondering what made them accept the establishment of a Soviet-dominated buffer zone over Eastern Europe in the postwar period. Were they, in fact, disappointed countries who found themselves attracted by – if not in the Communist camp – at least increasingly leftwing-to-neutralist orientations that characterized their foreign policies at various points in time.