appeasement definition us history

appeasement definition us history

The Significance of Appeasement in U.S. History

1. Introduction to Appeasement

While the term appeasement is generally used to describe British foreign policy toward Nazi Germany in the years before World War II, all modern democratic societies in their efforts to satisfy the demands of dictatorships short of war have been called appeasers. In 1947, the U.S. magazine The New Republic approvingly quoted Stalin’s description of Western policies between the two world wars as “a shameful fever of pacifism,” arguing that “All this was no more than a fantastic attempt to appease bellicose Fascism.” In 1961, an American liberal quoted with approval the Soviet premier’s explanation of the outbreak of World War II as due to the “sickly, morbid fear of giving offense to Hitler” on the part of the European powers, and in 1970, another American noted, without qualification, that “Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini together did not have the power to keep national dignity in the background and achieve a rational peace,” comparing European leaders’ Munich agreement to Nixon’s policies in Southeast Asia.

2. The Policy of Appeasement in U.S. Foreign Relations

Appeasement to resolve conflict is relevant across a range of potential adversaries, such as international terrorists, economic adversaries, human rights abusers, and autocratic developing country leaders. These interactions can reveal a deeper understanding of the dynamics and consequences of appeasement by learning from past U.S. experiences.

Political conflict has been a normal feature of international relations, and at times, creating a policy that relies on concessions to an adversary may be the correct foreign policy choice. Persuasive strategies, which seek to persuade an adversary to alter behavior by using a variety of positive inducements, may be preferable to threats, economic sanctions, or military action. Appeasement in this context can be seen as a subset of this broader category of conflict avoidance and resolution strategies.

In the application of the appeasement concept, one cannot simply label concessions designed to avoid violent conflict as appeasement unless the objective of the potential adversary is seen as fulfilling aggressive territorial or ideological goals. To be considered appeasement, concessions to an adversary must involve a risk of increased conflict or threat to national interests and result in policies that are not in the national interest.

The term “appeasement” derives from British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who, following the 1938 Munich conference, used it to describe his foreign policy of conciliation toward Adolf Hitler. By analogy, the word is often used to describe policies by leaders of other countries similar in approach and objective. Appeasement is a strategy designed to avoid political confrontations by making concessions, often associated with weakness. It may imply conflict avoidance or a reluctance to address past mistakes.

3. Critiques and Consequences of Appeasement in U.S. History

The specific aspects concerning U.S. history lie in the ascendency of the conservatisms who have been able to develop a certain mentality of appeasement, and in the consequences stemming from this. First of all, it is necessary to specify what kind of appeasement was concerned: without offensive meaning, it was the type tending to pacify or to reduce international tension. It can be generally classified as status-quo appeasement, tending “at preservation and at the prevention of any transformation of the current status of international relations.” When the status quo appeared as the principal obstacle to the creation of new international and domestic orders, such a form of appeasement had been overcome.

Applause during a public dinner and anti-British sentiment in the masses were ever present in those years. It was necessary to argue that nothing better could have been achieved. Roosevelt, as war was getting closer, hoped that “the region’s new relationships would come as a result of ‘a sudden shock’ that would ‘unlock the stalemate that now exists.’ Of course, as we now know, he knew how to guess that these new relationships would arise from the unleashing of the war.” War in fact unlocked the conservatives and turned the nation in an entirely different direction.

4. Lessons Learned and Implications for Modern Diplomacy

Those who fear encroachment against American values, ideology, or way of life should recognize the value of a mechanism like diplomacy in pursuing most objectives, be they permanent, transitional, residual, or negative in nature. However rigidly dogmatic American messianism may dictate an idealistic course, policymakers and those involved in peacemaking know that critical national interests are both relative and absolute. In public statements a decision-maker might argue that Americans are “ready to achieve it by any means necessary,” but in protracted bargaining the same figure might pursue relativism in a calculated or politically inevitable way. Idealism was a declining tactic, not a strategy, pursued not only with mutual stupidities but also by acculturalized isolationists and idealists who survived into the culture, considerable sensitivity, and flexibility of modern diplomacy. Idealistic American diplomacy and moralism devoid of moral clarity will do little good in attempting to transform an enemy into a partner, particularly when that enemy is involved in a fierce struggle to define or redefine its identity and is often destabilizing the existing international system.

The following are true for this historical lesson: Appeasement is not inherently dishonorable; the use of appeasement is neither new to the American experience nor absent from this century’s diplomacy; compromise with an enemy does not automatically result in war or jeopardize American security; isolationism does not force appeasement; and democracy’s triumph came in spite of, not because of, the appeasement that took place in the 1930s. From the historical perspective, principles such as the crucial role of power in diplomacy, the limitations of armament agreements, and least-worst solutions cannot be dismissed with assertions that they “subvert” America’s special mission.